applies to land-intensive commodities but not to labor-intensive or capital-intensive commodities. refutes the principle of comparative advantage. results in straight-line production possibilities curves rather than curves that are bowed outward from the origin. may limit the extent to which a nation specializes in producing a particular product.

Which of the following statements is correct? large corporations are taxed more favorably than sole proprietorships. corporate stockholders are exposed to unlimited liability. due to limited liability, unlimited lives, and ease of ownership transfer, the vast majority of u.s. businesses (in terms of number of businesses) are organized as corporations. most businesses (by number and total dollar sales) are organized as partnerships or proprietorships because it is easier to set up and operate in one of these forms rather than as a corporation. however, if the business gets very large, it becomes advantageous to convert to a corporation, mainly because corporations have important tax advantages over proprietorships and partnerships. most business (measured by dollar sales) is conducted by corporations in spite of large corporations’ often less favorable tax treatment, due to legal considerations related to ownership transfers and limited liability.

In transportation model analysis, the stepping-stone method is used to: a. obtain an initial feasible solutionb. evaluate empty cells for possible degeneracyc. evaluate empty cells for potential solution improvementsd. identify a dummy origin pointe. balance supply and demand

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?