Aworker (the row player) can choose to either work or shirk. her boss can choose to inspect or to sleep. payoffs are as given below, where c is the cost to the boss from inspecting. assume that c > 1 and also c < 4. show that there is no pure strategy equilibrium. solve for a mixed strategy equilibrium. how does the probability that the boss inspects change as c increases? how does the probability that the worker works increase with c? (these comparative statics results are sometimes thought to be counter-intuitive, but they are common in mixed strategy equilibria).

so far i think you have the right thing going for you just remember soh cah toh

step-by-step explanation:

sine over hypotenuse

cosine   equals adjacent

tangent over hypotenuse

d 25 pi/6

step-by-step explanation:

the diameter is 10 inches

the radius is 1/2 of the diameter or 5 inches

the area of the circle is

a = pi r^2

  = pi 5^2

  = 25 pi

the slice is 60 degrees of the entire circle.

60 degrees out of 360   60/360 = 1/6

the area of the slice is 1/6 of the circle

a slice = 1/6 a circle

a slice = 1/6 * 25 pi

required rate of return = 0.166 = 16.6%

step-by-step explanation:

under the capital asset pricing model (capm), the required or expected rate of return for a particular security or asset is given using the formula:

required rate of return = risk-free rate + beta*(market risk premium)

we are given that;

risk-free rate = 4% = 0.04

beta = 1.4

market risk premium = 9% = 0.09

we simply plug these values into the above formula;

required rate of return = 0.04 + 1.4*(0.09)

required rate of return = 0.04 + 0.126

required rate of return = 0.166 = 16.6%