In United States v. Lopez (1995), the United States Supreme Court declared the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 an unconstitutional overreach of the implied powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause. The 5-4 divided decision preserved the system of federalism and reversed the Supreme Court’s 50-year trend of rulings that expanded the powers of Congress.
Fast Facts: United States v. Lopez
Case Argued: November 4, 1994
Decision Issued: April 26, 1995
Petitioner: United States
Respondent: Alfonso Lopez, Jr.
Key Questions: Is the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act’s prohibition of possessing a gun in a school zone an unconstitutional overreach of the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause?
Majority Decision: Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy
Dissenting: Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter
Ruling: The legislative history of the Gun-Free School Zones Act failed to justify it as a constitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause.
Facts of the Case
On March 10, 1992, 12th-grader Alfonso Lopez, Jr. carried an unloaded handgun into his high school in San Antonio, Texas. After admitting to having the gun, Lopez was arrested and charged with violating the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act, which makes it a crime “for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm [in] a school zone.” After being indicted by a grand jury, Lopez was found guilty by a trial court and sentenced to six months in prison and two years on probation.
Lopez appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded the power granted to the Congress by the Commerce Clause. (The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes"). Congress had long cited the Commerce Clause as justification for passing gun control laws. Â
Finding that possession of a firearm had only a “trivial impact” on commerce, the Fifth Circuit overturned Lopez’s conviction, further noting that the legislative history of the Gun-Free School Zones Act failed to justify it as a constitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause.
In approving the United States government’s petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed to review the Circuit Court’s ruling.
Constitutional Issues
In its deliberations, the Supreme Court faced the question of whether the Gun-Free School Zones Act was a constitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause, which gives Congress power over interstate commerce. The Court was asked to consider whether the possession of a firearm in some way “affected” or “substantially affected” interstate commerce.
The Arguments
In its effort to demonstrate that possession of a firearm in a school zone was a matter that affects interstate commerce, the U.S. government offered the following two arguments:
Possession of a firearm in an educational environment heightens the likelihood of violent crimes, which in turn, will increase insurance costs and create expenses harmful to the economy. In addition, the perception of the danger of violence will limit the public’s willingness to travel to the area, thus harming the local economy.
With a well-educated populace being critical to the nation’s financial health, the presence of firearms in a school may frighten and distract students and teachers, inhibiting the learning process and thus leading to a weaker national economy.
Majority Opinion
In its 5-4 majority opinion, written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Supreme Court rejected both of the government’s arguments, finding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was not substantially related to interstate commerce.
First, the Court held that the government's argument would give the federal government virtually unlimited power to prohibit any activity (such as public assembly) that might lead to violent crime, regardless of that activity’s connection to interstate commerce.
Secondly, the Court held that the government's argument provided no safeguards to prevent Congress from applying the Commerce Clause as justification for legislation prohibiting any activity (such as careless spending) that might limit an individual’s economic productivity.
The opinion also rejected the government’s argument that by harming education, crime in schools substantially affects commerce. Justice Rehnquist concluded:
“To uphold the Government's contentions here, we have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States. This we are unwilling to do."
Dissenting Opinion
In the Court’s dissenting opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer cited three principles that he considered basic to the case:
