The amount you owe in state income tax is based on what

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

The silverside company is considering investing in two alternative projects: project 1 project 2 investment $500,000 $240,000 useful life (years) 8 7 estimated annual net cash inflows for useful life $120,000 $40,000 residual value $32,000 $10,000 depreciation method straightminusline straightminusline required rate of return 11% 8% what is the accounting rate of return for project 2? (round any intermediary calculations to the nearest dollar, and round your final answer to the nearest hundredth of a percent, x.xx%.)

The solution set for -18 < 5x-3 iso-3х3< xо-3хo3 > x