Determine the number of dependents in each of the following independent situations: (for example, 1, 2, 3, and so on). a. Reginald, a U. S. citizen and resident, contributes 100% of the support of his parents who are citizens of Canada and live there
b. Pablo, a U. S. citizen and resident, contributes 100% of the support of his parents who are citizens of Panama. Pablo's father is a resident of Panama, and his mother is a legal resident of the United States.
c. Gretchen, a U. S. citizen and resident, contributes 100% of the support of her parents who are U. S. citizens but residents of Germany.
d. Elena is a U. S. citizen and a resident of Italy. Her household includes Carlos, a four-year-old adopted son who is a citizen of Spain.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?