Jane is a salesperson for a company that manufactures laptop computers. One of her customers left her a message indicating that he was unhappy about the last order he received. While on her way to visit the customer to discuss the problem, Jane decides to review her procedure for handling complaints. What is the first thing she needs to do in order to resolve the customer's complaint

After testing its water, a city water department issues a report to the related citizens, noting what chemicals have been identified, their doses, and the estimated risks of exposure at these levels. this report represents a type of

Ernesto baca is employed by bigg company. he has a family membership in his company's health insurance program. the annual premium is $5,432. ernesto's employer pays 80% of the total cost. ernesto's contribution is deducted from his paycheck. what is his annual contribution? $1,086.40 $1,125.65 $1,527.98 $1,567.20 save and exit

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?