Business, 01.10.2021 04:40 jetjet123123

The invention of what product skyrocketed the popularity of pecan pie?

Answers: 3

Show answers

Another question on Business

Business, 21.06.2019 23:00

Each of the four independent situations below describes a sales-type lease in which annual lease payments of $12,500 are payable at the beginning of each year. each is a finance lease for the lessee. (fv of $1, pv of $1, fva of $1, pva of $1, fvad of $1 and pvad of $1) (use appropriate factor(s) from the tables provided.) situation 1 2 3 4 lease term (years) 3 3 3 3 assetâ€™s useful life (years) 3 4 4 6 lessorâ€™s implicit rate (known by lessee) 14 % 14 % 14 % 14 % residual value: guaranteed by lessee 0 $ 5,000 $ 2,500 0 unguaranteed 0 0 $ 2,500 $ 5,000 purchase option: after (years) none 2 3 3 exercise price n/a $ 7,500 $ 1,500 $ 3,500 reasonably certain? n/a no no yes

Answers: 1

Answer

Business, 22.06.2019 22:20

Which of the following is correct? a. a tax burden falls more heavily on the side of the market that is more elastic.b. a tax burden falls more heavily on the side of the market that is less elastic.c. a tax burden falls more heavily on the side of the market that is closer to unit elastic.d. a tax burden is distributed independently of the relative elasticities of supply and demand.

Answers: 1

Answer

Business, 22.06.2019 23:50

When a market is in equilibrium, the buyers are those with the willingness to pay and the sellers are those with the costs.

Answers: 2

Answer

Business, 23.06.2019 00:00

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?