Help me please Raul is shopping for new shoes and has three sites to choose from when ordering.
He picks the most expensive among the sites because he knows they donated to his
favorite charity and because he's heard his friends say good things about the site.
What is this an example of the power of?

A. quality control
B. goodwill
C. reach
D. wear-out

Over the past year, three of the star salesmen at family resorts international's corporate office have been lured away to competitors. on top of that, karina, the general manager of the sales department, has noticed that most employees come in, do their jobs, and leave. family resorts offers a good salary, benefits, and tuition reimbursement, as well as a number of development and training programs. most employees seem contented enough, but karina would like to do something to increase the level of engagement among her staff. what do you think karina should do?

By 2020, automobile market analysts expect that the demand for electric autos will increase as buyers become more familiar with the technology. however, the costs of producing electric autos may increase because of higher costs for inputs (e.g., rare earth elements), or they may decrease as the manufacturers learn better assembly methods (i.e., learning by doing). what is the expected impact of these changes on the equilibrium price and quantity for electric autos?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?