Business, 16.09.2021 01:00 Jtyree2007

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Business, 22.06.2019 19:30

Exercise 4-9presented below is information related to martinez corp. for the year 2017.net sales $1,399,500 write-off of inventory due to obsolescence $80,440cost of goods sold 788,200 depreciation expense omitted by accident in 2016 43,600selling expenses 65,800 casualty loss 53,900administrative expenses 53,500 cash dividends declared 43,300dividend revenue 22,100 retained earnings at december 31, 2016 1,042,400interest revenue 7,420 effective tax rate of 34% on all items exercise 4-9 presented below is information relateexercise 4-9 presented below is information relate prepare a multiple-step income statement for 2017. assume that 61,500 shares of common stock are outstanding. (round earnings per share to 2 decimal places, e.g. 1.49.)prepare a separate retained earnings statement for 2017. (list items that increase retained earnings first.)

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Business, 23.06.2019 00:00

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

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