Suppose the United States and Taiwan produce only cell phones and digital music players. Assume that each country uses only labor to produce each good, and that the cell phones and digital music players made in the United States and Taiwan are exactly alike. The table below shows how much each country can produce of each good with one hour of labor. Output per Hour of Labor
Cell Phones Digital Music Players
United States 5 8
Taiwan 24 14
According to the table, has an absolute advantage in producing cell phones, and has an absolute advantage in producing digital music players.
At the same time, has a comparative advantage in producing cell phones, and has a comparative advantage in producing digital music players.

Exercise 4-6 the following balances were taken from the books of alonzo corp. on december 31, 2017. interest revenue $86,000 accumulated depreciation—equipment $40,000 cash 51,000 accumulated depreciation—buildings 28,000 sales revenue 1,380,000 notes receivable 155,000 accounts receivable 150,000 selling expenses 194,000 prepaid insurance 20,000 accounts payable 170,000 sales returns and allowances 150,000 bonds payable 100,000 allowance for doubtful accounts 7,000 administrative and general expenses 97,000 sales discounts 45,000 accrued liabilities 32,000 land 100,000 interest expense 60,000 equipment 200,000 notes payable 100,000 buildings 140,000 loss from earthquake damage 150,000 cost of goods sold 621,000 common stock 500,000 retained earnings 21,000 assume the total effective tax rate on all items is 34%. prepare a multiple-step income statement; 100,000 shares of common stock were outstanding during the year. (round earnings per share to 2 decimal places, e.g. 1.48.)

4.     chef a says that broth should be brought to a boil. chef b says that broth should be kept at an even, gentle simmer. which chef is correct? a. neither chef is correct. b. chef a is correct. c. both chefs are correct. d. chef b is correct. student c   incorrect which is right answer

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?