Make versus Buy decision: Olde Charm Bakery makes sandwiches, pastries, cakes, and cookies. Currently it makes its own sourdough bread at a total unit cost of $1.72:
Direct materials $0.78
Direct labor 0.48
Variable OH 0.26
Fixed OH 0.20
Total unit cost $1.72
On average, Olde Charm Bakery needs 1,000 loaves of sourdough dough bread every month.
Kostco, a sourdough bread manufacturer, has approached Olde Charm Bakery with a proposal to provide all the bread that Olde Charm Bakery needs at a unit price of $1.50.
Should Olde Charm Bakery continue to make its own sourdough bread or should it buy it from Kostco? Assume 3/4 of the fixed OH is avoidable.

Oakmont company has an opportunity to manufacture and sell a new product for a four-year period. the company’s discount rate is 18%. after careful study, oakmont estimated the following costs and revenues for the new product: cost of equipment needed $ 230,000 working capital needed $ 84,000 overhaul of the equipment in year two $ 9,000 salvage value of the equipment in four years $ 12,000 annual revenues and costs: sales revenues $ 400,000 variable expenses $ 195,000 fixed out-of-pocket operating costs $ 85,000 when the project concludes in four years the working capital will be released for investment elsewhere within the company. click here to view exhibit 12b-1 and exhibit 12b-2, to determine the appropriate discount factor(s) using tables.

howard, fine, & howard is an advertising agency. the firm uses an activity-based costing system to allocate overhead costs to its services. information about the firm's activity cost pool rates follows: stooge company was a client of howard, fine, & howard. recently, 7 administrative assistant hours, 3 new ad campaigns, and 8 meeting hours were incurred for the stooge company account. using the activity-based costing system, how much overhead cost would be allocated to the stooge company account?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?