The balance sheet of Cranium Gaming reports total assets of $380,000 and $680,000 at the beginning and end of the year, respectively. Sales revenues are $1.30 million, net income is $63,000, and operating cash flows are $54,000. Calculate the cash return on assets, cash flow to sales, and asset turnover for Cranium Gaming. (Enter your answers in dollars, not millions (i. e., $10.1 million should be entered as 10,100,000).)

Suppose the number of equipment sales and service contracts that a store sold during the last six (6) months for treadmills and exercise bikes was as follows: treadmill exercise bike total sold 185 123 service contracts 67 55 the store can only sell a service contract on a new piece of equipment. of the 185 treadmills sold, 67 included a service contract and 118 did not.

Over the past year, three of the star salesmen at family resorts international's corporate office have been lured away to competitors. on top of that, karina, the general manager of the sales department, has noticed that most employees come in, do their jobs, and leave. family resorts offers a good salary, benefits, and tuition reimbursement, as well as a number of development and training programs. most employees seem contented enough, but karina would like to do something to increase the level of engagement among her staff. what do you think karina should do?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?