Firm 1 and firm 2 are competing for a franchise. The present value of the net revenues generated by the franchise are equal to R. Each firm’s probability of winning the franchise is given by its proportion of the total spent by the two firms on lobbying the local government committee that awards the franchise. That is, if I1 and I2 represent the lobbying expenditures of firms 1 and 2, respectively, then firm 1’s probability of winning is given by I1/(I1 + I2), while firm 2’s probability of winning is I2/(I1 + I2). If each firm assumes that the other firm’s spending is independent of its own, what is the equilibrium level of spending for each firm?

Monroe just left his second job in the marketing, sales, and service career pathway. he was self-employed at his first job, and worked for a nonprofit for his second job. he recently took another job in logistics and distribution.  which  best  explains monroe’s career history? monroe worked in marketing communications and promotions in his first job, professional sales and marketing in his second job, and now works for a private company.monroe worked in buying and merchandising in his first job, e-marketing in his second job, and now works for the government.monroe worked in professional sales and marketing in his first job,  management and entrepreneurship in his second job, and is now  self-employed.monroe worked in   marketing research  in his first job, professional sales and marketing in his second job, and now works for a private company.