Business, 21.09.2019 18:10 andrwisawesome0

Games such as “peek-a-boo” are important for infants because they babies develop

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Business, 22.06.2019 22:00

In 2018, laureen is currently single. she paid $2,800 of qualified tuition and related expenses for each of her twin daughters sheri and meri to attend state university as freshmen ($2,800 each for a total of $5,600). sheri and meri qualify as laureen’s dependents. laureen also paid $1,900 for her son ryan’s (also laureen’s dependent) tuition and related expenses to attend his junior year at state university. finally, laureen paid $1,200 for herself to attend seminars at a community college to her improve her job skills.what is the maximum amount of education credits laureen can claim for these expenditures in each of the following alternative scenarios? a. laureen's agi is $45,000.b. laureen’s agi is $95,000.c. laureen’s agi is $45,000 and laureen paid $12,000 (not $1,900) for ryan to attend graduate school (i.e, his fifth year, not his junior year).

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Business, 22.06.2019 22:30

Using the smith's bbq report, the cost of wine for next week will increase by 2% from the current week. if all other cost of sales stays constant, what will be the approximate total cost of sales for next week?

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Business, 23.06.2019 00:00

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

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