g Foster Manufacturing uses a job order cost accounting system. On April 1, the company has Work in Process Inventory of $7,600 and two jobs in process: Job No. 221, $3,600, and Job No. 222, $4,000. During April, a summary of source documents reveals the following: For Materials Requisition Slips Labor Time Tickets Job No. 221 $1,200 $2,100 222 1,700 2,200 223 2,400 2,900 224 2,600 2,800 General use 600 400 Totals $8,500 $10,400 Foster applies manufacturing overhead to jobs at an overhead rate of 70% of direct labor cost. Job No. 221 is completed during the month. Prepare summary journal entries to record the raw materials requisitioned, factory labor used, the assignment of manufacturing overhead to jobs, and the completion of Job No. 221. (Credit account titles are automatically indented when the amount is entered. Do not indent manually.)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?