Kurnick Co. expects that the pound will depreciate from $1.74 to $1.72 in one year. It has no money to invest, but it could borrow money to invest. A bank allows it to borrow either 1.2 million dollars or 1.2 million pounds for one year. It can borrow dollars at 6.0 percent or British pounds at 4.5 percent for one year. It can invest in a risk-free dollar deposit at 4.5 percent for one year or a risk-free British deposit at 3.5 percent for one year. Determine the expected profit or loss (in dollars) if Kurnick Co. pursues a strategy to capitalize on the expected depreciation of the pound. Do not round intermediate calculations. Round your answer to the nearest dollar. Enter your answer as a positive value.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?