-I say key in a relationship is trust and if you dont have trust you dont need to be in a relationship- i say if you going to believe everything somebody tell you then don't have friends nor dont be in a relationship-everything people tell you is true or sometimes it could be true-

Richardson hired j.c. flood company, a plumbing contractor, to correct a stoppage in the sewer line of her house. the plumbing company's 'snake' device, used to clear the line leading to the main sewer, became caught in the underground line. to release it, the company excavated a portion of the sewer line in richardson's backyard. in the process, the company discovered numerous leaks in a rusty, defective water pipe that ran parallel with the sewer line. to meet public regulations, the water pipe, of a type no longer approved for such service, had to be replaced either then or later, when the yard would have to be excavated again. the plumbing company proceeded to repair the water pipe. though richardson inspected the company's work daily and did not express any objection to the extra work involved in replacing the water pipe, she refused to pay any part of the total bill after the company completed the entire operation. j.c. flood company then sued richardson for the costs of labor and material it had furnished. (c) for what, if anything, should richardson be liable? explain."

Bulldog holdings is a u.s.-based consumer electronics company. it owns smaller firms in japan and taiwan where most of its cell phone technology is developed and manufactured before being released worldwide. which of the following alternatives to integration does this best illustrate? a. venture capitalism b. franchising c. joint venture d. parent-subsidiary relationship

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?