Every year, management and labor renegotiate a new employment contract by sending their proposals to an arbitrator, who chooses the best proposal (effectively giving one side or the other $3 million). Each side can choose to hire, or not hire, an expensive labor lawyer (at a cost of $300,000) who is effective at preparing the proposal in the best light. If neither hires a lawyer or if both hire lawyers, each side can expect to win about half the time. If only one side hires a lawyer, it can expect to win nine tenths, or 0.9, of the time. Use the information to fill in an expected payoff matrix, in dollars. The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Management to a lawyer and for Labor to a lawyer. (hire or not hire)

The monthly demand equation for an electric utility company is estimated to be p equals 60 minus left parenthesis 10 superscript negative 5 baseline right parenthesis x, where p is measured in dollars and x is measured in thousands of killowatt-hours. the utility has fixed costs of $3 comma 000 comma 000 per month and variable costs of $32 per 1000 kilowatt-hours of electricity generated, so the cost function is upper c left parenthesis x right parenthesis equals 3 times 10 superscript 6 baseline plus 32 x. (a) find the value of x and the corresponding price for 1000 kilowatt-hours that maximize the utility's profit. (b) suppose that the rising fuel costs increase the utility's variable costs from $32 to $38, so its new cost function is upper c 1 left parenthesis x right parenthesis equals 3 times 10 superscript 6 baseline plus 38 x. should the utility pass all this increase of $6 per thousand kilowatt-hours on to the consumers?