Supermarket customers load their carts with goods totaling between $5 and $200, uniformly (and continuously) distributed; call this the raw order amount . Assume that customers purchase independently of each other. At checkout, 63% of customers have a loyalty card that gives them 4% off their raw order amount. Also at checkout, 18% of customers have coupons that give them 7% off their raw order amount. These two discounts occur independently of each other, and a given customer could have one or the other of them, both of them, or neither of them, to get to their net order amount (what they actually pay). Construct a spreadsheet simulation to simulate 100 customers and collect statistics on the net order amount; these statistics should include the average, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and a histogram to describe the distribution of the net order amounts between $0 and $200. To

Zeta corporation is a manufacturer of sports caps, which require soft fabric. the standards for each cap allow 2.00 yards of soft fabric, at a cost of $2.00 per yard. during the month of january, the company purchased 25,000 yards of soft fabric at $2.10 per yard, to produce 12,000 caps. what is zeta corporation's materials price variance for the month of january?

Cherokee inc. is a merchandiser that provided the following information: amount number of units sold 20,000 selling price per unit $ 30 variable selling expense per unit $ 4 variable administrative expense per unit $ 2 total fixed selling expense $ 40,000 total fixed administrative expense $ 30,000 beginning merchandise inventory $ 24,000 ending merchandise inventory $ 44,000 merchandise purchases $ 180,000 required: 1. prepare a traditional income statement. 2. prepare a contribution format income statement.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?