Assume a firm is purchasing new equipment for a project. The selling price of the product along with the variable cost, fixed costs and annual depreciation expense have been determined. The firm is about to calculate its accounting, cash and financial break even points. Which break even points will the project reach first, then second and finally last

Employees at a library check out books to patrons. books have an isbn and a name. the library sometimes has multiple copies of the same book. books have one or more authors. a patron is an individual who has an active (non-expired) library card. for each library card, we store the person's first and last names and their address. for each employee, we store their employee id, current salary, first and last name and their address. we also store the employee id of their current manager. each time we check out a book to a patron we need to store the date of the transaction, the employee who checked out the book to the patron, and the library card of the patron. some employees have library cards. if an employee patron turns in a book late, the fine that they pay is a percentage of their salary. some employees are authors who have library cards—they are allowed to check out as many books as they like.

Which of the following best describes vertical integration? a. produce goods or services previously purchasedb. develop the ability to produce products that complement the original productc. develop the ability to produce the specified good more efficiently than befored. build long term partnerships with a few supplierse. sell products to a supplier or a distributor

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?