To measure system performance, companies use , which uses a set of standard tests on one system to compare its performance and capacity to that of other systems. a. benchmark testing
b. threat analysis
c. metric analysis
d. allocation testing

Verizon communications, inc., provides the following footnote relating to its leasing activities in its 10-k report. the aggregate minimum rental commitments under noncancelable leases for the periods shown at december 31, 2010, are as follows: years (dollars in millions) capital leases operatingleases 2011 $97 $1,898 2012 74 1,720 2013 70 1,471 2014 54 1,255 2015 42 1,012 thereafter 81 5,277 total minimum 418 $ 12,633 rental commitments less interest and (86) executory costs present value of 332 minimum lease payments less current (75) installments long-term obligation $257 at december 31, 2010 (a) confirm that verizon capitalized its capital leases using a rate of 7.4 %. (b) compute the present value of verizon's operating leases, assuming an 7.4% discount rate and rounding the remaining lease term to 3 decimal places. (use a financial calculator or excel to compute. do not round until your final answers. round each answer to the nearest whole number.)

Ski powder resort ends its fiscal year on april 30. the business adjusts its accounts monthly, but closes them only at year-end (april 30). the resort's busy season is from december 1 through march 31. adrian pride, the resort's chief financial officer, the museums a close watch on lift ticket revenue and cash. the balances of these accounts at the end of each of the last five months are as follows:

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?