Jeremy purchases a share in a company. What rights does he possess after the purchase? Jeremy is a (bond issuer, shareholder, or security?) of the company. Therefore, he gets the right to be a partial (employee, owner or supplier?). This means when board members declare dividends, he is entitled to (income, promotion or pay hike?). He has the right to (store, supply or sell?) these shares whenever he wants. He can also look into the company's annual reports and sue for discrepancies.

Dyed-denim corporation is seeking to lower the costs of value creation and achieve a low-cost position. as a result, it plans to move its manufacturing plant from the u.s. to thailand, which based on company research, is the optimal location for production. this strategic move will most likely allow the company to realize

On january 2, 2018, bering co. disposes of a machine costing $34,100 with accumulated depreciation of $18,369. prepare the entries to record the disposal under each of the following separate assumptions. exercise 8-24a part 2 2. the machine is traded in for a newer machine having a $50,600 cash price. a $16,238 trade-in allowance is received, and the balance is paid in cash. assume the asset exchange has commercial substance.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?