. Hi-Grade Regulator Company currently has 100,000 shares of common stock outstanding with a market price of $60 per share. It also has $2 million in 6 percent bonds. The company is considering a $3 million expansion
program that it can finance with all common stock at $60 a share (option 1), straight bonds at 8 percent interest
(option 2), preferred stock at 7 percent (option 3), and half common stock at $60 per share and half 8 percent
bonds (option 4).
a. For an expected EBIT level of $1 million after the expansion program, calculate the earnings per share
for each of the alternative methods of financing. Assume a tax rate of 50 percent.
b. Construct an EBIT-EPS chart.
c. Calculate the indifference points between alternatives.
d. What is your interpretation of them?

You should do all of the following before a job interview except

Exhibit 34-1 country a country b good x 90 60 30 0 good ygood x good y 0 30 60 90 30 20 10 20 40 60 refer to exhibit 34-1. considering the data, which of the following term to? a. 1 unit of y for 1 unit of x b. 1 unit of y for 0.75 units of x c. 1 unit of y for 0.25 units of x d. 1 unit of y for 1.50 units of x e. all of the above s of trade would both countries agree 8. it -

Why is the cournot equilibrium an​ equilibrium? a. there are​ short-run barriers to exit in a cournot​ duopoly, so both firms cannot alter their output levels. b. given the other​ firm's level of​ production, both firms are maximizing profits and cannot improve their situation by unilaterally altering their level of output. c. both firms operate at zero profit under a cournot​ equilibrium, so they would face negative profits if they change output. d. both firms operate at minimum​ long-run average cost under a cournot​ equilibrium, so changes to output would reduce​ long-run profits. even if they​ can't collude, why​ don't firms set their outputs at the joint​ profit-maximizing levels​ (i.e., the levels they would have chosen had they​ colluded)? a. given that other firm produces at the collusive​ level, a firm could increase their own profits by increasing output above the collusive level. b. the midpoint of the collusion curve​ (i.e., the collusive​ outcome) lies below the reaction​ curves, so both firms have an incentive to increase output under the cournot duopoly. c. both a and b are correct d. both a and b are incorrect