Nader, Inc., has the following information available from prior month and the general ledgert: Costs in Beginning WIP Costs added Current PeriodDirect materials $2,300 $ 21,252Conversion costs 6,200 150,536Total beginning WIP $8,500At the beginning of the period, there were 500 units in process that were 40 percent complete as to conversion costs. During the current period, 4,300 units were started and completed. Ending inventory contained 320 units that were 80 percent complete as to conversion costs. Direct materials are added at the beginning of the process. (Assume that the company uses the FIFO costing method.)The equivalent units of production for direct materials and conversion costs, respectively, were:.A) 5,120 for direct materials and 5,056 for conversion costs. B) 4,480 for direct materials and 4,544 for conversion costs. C) 4,120 for direct materials and 4,056 for conversion costs. D) 4,620 for direct materials and 4,856 for conversion costs.

Determining effects of stock splits oracle corp has had the following stock splits since its inception. effective date split amount october 12, 2000 2 for 1 january 18, 2000 2 for 1 february 26, 1999 3 for 2 august 15, 1997 3 for 2 april 16, 1996 3 for 2 february 22, 1995 3 for 2 november 8, 1993 2 for 1 june 16,1989 2 for 1 december 21, 1987 2 for 1 march 9, 1987 2 for 1 a. if the par value of oracle shares was originally $2, what would oracle corp. report as par value per share on its 2015 balance sheet? compute the revised par value after each stock split. round answers to three decimal places.

When patey pontoons issued 4% bonds on january 1, 2018, with a face amount of $660,000, the market yield for bonds of similar risk and maturity was 5%. the bonds mature december 31, 2021 (4 years). interest is paid semiannually on june 30 and december 31?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?