Answers: 2
Business, 21.06.2019 14:30
Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1
Answers: 1
Business, 22.06.2019 11:00
Consider an economy where government expenditures are 10 and total tax revenues are 10. the supply of labor is fixed at 125 and the supply of capital is fixed at 8. the economy is described by the following equations. y k to the power of 1 divided by 3 end exponent l to the power of 2 divided by 3 end exponent c 2.5 + 0.75 ( y - t ) i 10 - 0.5 r the level of private savings is
Answers: 1
Business, 22.06.2019 16:30
Which of the following has the largest impact on opportunity cost
Answers: 2
"An analysis of yield curves of U. S. Government and lower medium quality corporate bonds shows the...
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