You are CEO of Rivet Networks, maker of ultra-high performance network cards for gaming computers, and you are considering whether to launch a new product. The product, the Killer X3000, will cost $900,000 to develop up front (year 0), and you expect revenues the first year of $790,000, growing to $1.43 million the second year, and then declining by 45% per year for the next 3 years before the product is fully obsolete. In years 1 through 5, you will have fixed costs associated with the product of $91,000 per year, and variable costs equal to 50% of revenues.    a. What are the cash flows for the project in years 0 through5?
b. Plot the NPV profile for this investment using discount rates from 0% to 40% in 10% increments.
c. What is the project's NPV if the project's cost of capital is 10.3%?
d. Use the NPV profile to estimate the cost of capital at which the project would become unprofitable; that is, estimate theproject's IRR.

Jackson is preparing for his hearing before the federal communications commission (fcc) involving a complaint that was filed against him by the fcc regarding the interruption of radio frequency. the order to "cease and desist" using the radio frequency has had a detrimental impact on his business. once the administrative law judge prepares his or her initial order, jackson has no further options. no, jackson can request that the matter be reviewed by an agency board or commission. yes, once the initial order is presented, it's only a matter of time before the order becomes final.

Zara, a global retail and apparel manufacturer based in spain that has successfully implemented this idea by having a continuous flow of new products that are typically limited in supply. zara has created a system that draws its clientèle into its stores, on average, 17 times per year as compared to 4 times per year for most stores. how is zara using it to gain competitive advantage? what specific technologies are used by zara to maintain this advantage over its competition?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?