After years of banking with Bigbux Bank, Samuel decided to switch to a competing institution. Thanks to changes in government regulation, his search will uncover a variety of options; however, he will also learn that banks and nonbanks have merged in order to be more competitive in the banking and financial services industries, which may or may not increase his options.

According to management education expert ashok rao, companies can increase their profitability by through careful inventory management. a. 5% to 10% b. 10% to 25% c. 20% to 50% d. 75%

Caleb construction (cc) incurs supervisor salaries expense in the construction of homes. if cc manufactures 100 homes in a year, fixed supervisor salaries will be $400,000. with the current construction supervisors, cc's productive capacity is 150 homes in a year. however, if cc is contracts to build more than 150 homes per year, it will need to hire additional supervisors, which are hired as full-time rather than temporary employees. cc's productive capacity would then become 200 homes per year, and salaries expense would increase to $470,000. how would cc’s salaries expense be properly classified? fixed variable mixed stepped curvilinear

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?