The common stock of Leaning Tower of Pita Inc., a restaurant chain, will generate payoffs to investors next year, which depend on the state of the economy, as follows: Dividend Stock Price Boom $ 10 $ 200 Normal economy 6 90 Recession 0 0 The company goes out of business if a recession hits. Assume for simplicity that the three possible states of the economy are equally likely. The stock is selling today for $80.
a. Calculate the rate of return to Leaning Tower of Pita shareholders for each economic state. (Negative amounts should be indicated by a minus sign. Enter your answers as a percent rounded to 2 decimal places.) Rate of return Boom Normal economy Recession a-2.
b. Calculate the expected rate of return and standard deviation of return to Leaning Tower of Pita shareholders. (Do not round intermediate calculations. Enter your answers as a percent rounded to 2 decimal places.) Expected return Standard deviation

6carla would like to buy a dress, a dresser for her bedroom, and a home theater system. she has one month's worth of living expenses in her emergency fund. carla decides to save for the home theater system. did carla make the right decision? why or why not? a. yes; her emergency fund is full and the other items will probably be less expensive. b. yes; she could save more for her emergency fund, but the home theater will be harder to save for. c. no; she should save more for her emergency fund because she has saved less than the recommended amount. d. no; she should have bought the dress and dresser first because she could afford them right away. reset next

Perry is a freshman, he estimates that the cost of tuition, books, room and board, transportation, and other incidentals will be $30000 this year. he expects these costs to rise about $1500 each year while he is in college. if it will take him 5 years to earn his bs, what is the present cost of his degree at an interest rate of 6%? if he earns and extra $10000 annually for 40 years, what is the present worth of his degree.?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?