Net income was $477,000. Issued common stock for $71,000 cash. Paid cash dividend of $15,000. Paid $115,000 cash to settle a note payable at its $115,000 maturity value. Paid $120,000 cash to acquire its treasury stock. Purchased equipment for $93,000 cash. Use the above information to determine cash flows from financing activities. (Amounts to be deducted should be indicated with a minus sign.)

Carlos hears juan and rita’s complaints about the new employees with whom they have to work with, as well as their threats to quit the company. if carlos were to reassign juan and rita to new, unique roles and separate them from the ronny and bill, it would signal that carlos has moved into the stage of managing resistance.

Why is it easier for new entrants to get involved in radical innovations when compared to incumbent firms? a. unlike incumbent firms, new entrants do not have to face the high entry barriers, initially. b. new entrants are embedded in an innovation ecosystem, while incumbent firms are not. c. unlike incumbent firms, new entrants do not have formal organizational structures and processes. d. incumbent firms do not have the advantages of network effects that new entrants have.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?