In a Stackelberg oligopoly

A. the leader moves first, and the follower chooses its output in the second stage of the game.
B. both firms act simultaneously, but one chooses price and the other output level.
C. the leader moves first, and the follower chooses its price in the second stage of the game.
D. there is no Nash equilibrium.

The correct answer is A. the leader moves first, and the follower chooses its output in the second stage of the game.

Explanation:

The Stackelberg duopoly chant, also known as a Pinus model outside of the Stackelberg, is a game. In a Pinus model based on the imperfect he is not performing in concert. 1934 was developed by Peter Stackelberg in his "Greek and Roman Market Equilibrium" (Market and Cruciferse). It represents a point of curvature in the study of market structures, especially in what was reported to the infection of the duopolies, BECAUSE a tail is a model that is based on different initial hypotheses, conclusions and samples that are different from those of the models of the duopolies. incisors oh and like Cournot and Bertrand.

Theon'a games in A Stackelberg's sequential duopoly game are (without simultaneous operation of a Cournot Difference model). In this model, two existing companies demand that they are subject to the production of homogeneous goods and according to costs. One of the company: The Leader, perhaps with you, which is a sign of a greater Acquaintance DUE: it is you, who, by virtue of greater virtue, are better than the Quantity positioned to Decide First how much, bar and offer. The other Company, LA Followers: After the Company they observed Plan of the First, Quantity That will choose will offer Q2. TO FIND THE GAME WE HAVE TO GET BACK FROM THE STUDY OF THE SEASONS, the balanced use of the Nash, as a game in any sequential.

explanation:

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answer makes less frequent trips to the bank and firms make less frequent price changes;