Anton believes his company's overhead costs are driven (affected) by the number of machine hours because the production process is heavily automated. During the period, the company produced 3,000 units of Product A requiring a total of 100 machine hours and 2,000 units of Product B requiring a total of 25 machine hours. What allocation rate should be used if the company incurs overhead costs of $10,000?

Advertisers are usually very conscious of their audience. choose an issue of a popular magazine such as time, sports illustrated, vanity fair, rolling stone, or the like. from that issue select three advertisements to analyze. try to determine the audience being appealed to in each advertisement and analyze the appeals used to persuade buyers. how might the appeals differ is the ads were designed to persuade a different audience.

Keisha took the vark inventory and discovered she prefers to learn mainly through visual and kinesthetic modes. which study strategy would best match these preferences?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?