Two of Diana's friends have approached her about starting a new business. Diana is willing to invest money in the business and share in its profits, but she has no desire to be involved in the day-to-day management of the company, nor is she willing to risk any amount beyond her initial investment. Diana's preferences suggest that she prefers a general partnership form of business ownership. a. Trueb. False

Select the correct answer. ramon applied to the state university in the city where he lives, but he was denied admission. what should he do now? a.change his mind about graduating and drop out of high school so he can start working right away. b. decide not to go to college, because he didn’t have a backup plan. c.stay positive and write a mean letter to let the college know that they made a bad decision. d. learn from this opportunity, reevaluate his options, and apply to his second and third choices.

1. which one of the following would be an example of a supply-side market failure? a. a gas station is slowly leaking diesel fuel from its underground tanks, and after the leak is discovered, the business immediately cleans up the pollution at its own expense. b. a gas station is slowly leaking diesel fuel from its underground tanks, but the state uses taxpayer money to clean up the pollution rather than requiring the business to pay. c. your business wants to attract repeat customers by putting on a customer-appreciation picnic at a public park, but you decide not to because you couldn't prevent noncustomers from consuming the food and entertainment you provided. d. everyone rushes to the local retail outlet at midnight on the day of the release of a new video game console, and the store runs out before everyone is able to buy one.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?