A monopsonist’s demand for labor can be written as VMPE = 40 - 0.004ED. Labor is supplied to the firm according to w = 5 + 0.01ES. Thus, the firm’s marginal cost of hiring workers when it hires off of this supply schedule is MCE = 5 + 0.02ES. a. How much labor does the monopsony firm hire and at what wage when there is no minimum wage? b. How much labor does the monopsony firm hire and at what wage when it must pay a minimum wage of $25?

Eagle sporting goods reported the following data at july ​31, 2016​, with amounts adapted in​ thousands: ​(click the icon to view the income​ statement.) ​(click the icon to view the statement of retained​ earnings.) ​(click the icon to view the balance​ sheet.) 1. compute eagle​'s net working capital. 2. compute eagle​'s current ratio. round to two decimal places. 3. compute eagle​'s debt ratio. round to two decimal places. do these values and ratios look​ strong, weak or​ middle-of-the-road? 1. compute eagle​'s net working capital. total current assets - total current liabilities = net working capital 99400 - 30000 = 69400 2. compute eagle​'s current ratio. ​(round answer to two decimal​ places.) total current assets / total current liabilities = current ratio 99400 / 30000 = 3.31 3. compute eagle​'s debt ratio. ​(round answer to two decimal​ places.) total liabilities / total assets = debt ratio 65000 / 130000 = 0.50 do these ratio values and ratios look​ strong, weak or​ middle-of-the-road? net working capital is ▾ . this means ▾ current assets exceed current liabilities current liabilities exceed current assets and is a ▾ negative positive sign. eagle​'s current ratio is considered ▾ middle-of-the-road. strong. weak. eagle​'s debt ratio is considered ▾ middle-of-the-road. strong. weak. choose from any list or enter any number in the input fields and then continue to the next question.

Suppose the marginal damage and marginal benefit curves in a polluted neighborhood are md = p/3 and mb = 4 – p. also, suppose that transactions costs are low, so that the consumers and the firm can bargain. we saw that in this case, the socially-optimal level of pollution is achieved. start by computing the socially-optimal p. then, for each of the following cases, compute the amount of money transferred through the bargaining process, and indicate who pays whom (i.e., whether consumers pay the firm, or vice versa). also, compute the gains to each party relative to the status quo (i.e., the starting point of the bargaining process).a)consumers have the right to clean air; firm is dominant in the bargaining process.b)consumers have the right to clean air; consumers are dominant in the bargaining process.c)firm has the right to pollute; firm is dominant in the bargaining process.d)firm has the right to pollute; consumers are dominant in the bargaining proces

Refer to the payoff matrix. suppose that speedy bike and power bike are the only two bicycle manufacturing firms serving the market. both can choose large or small advertising budgets. is there a nash equilibrium solution to this game?