During the year, Anna rented her vacation home for 87 days, used it personally for 13 days, and left it vacant for 265 days. She had the following income and expenses: Rent income $7,000 Expenses Real estate taxes 2,500 Interest on mortgage 9,000 Utilities 2,400 Repairs 1,000 Roof replacement (a capital expenditure) 12,000 Depreciation 7,500 If required, round your answers to the nearest dollar. If an amount is zero, enter "0". Assume 365 days in a year. a. Is her vacation home classified as rental property? Yes b. Compute the following regarding the rental use of the property: Gross income: $ Total expenses: $ c. Anna has a net rental loss of $ this year. d. What amount of the real estate taxes can Anna deduct as an itemized deduction? $ e. What amount of the mortgage interest can Anna deduct as an itemized deduction? $

T-comm makes a variety of products. it is organized in two divisions, north and south. the managers for each division are paid, in part, based on the financial performance of their divisions. the south division normally sells to outside customers but, on occasion, also sells to the north division. when it does, corporate policy states that the price must be cost plus 20 percent to ensure a "fair" return to the selling division. south received an order from north for 300 units. south's planned output for the year had been 1,200 units before north's order. south's capacity is 1,500 units per year. the costs for producing those 1,200 units follow

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

Which of the following emails should he save in this folder instead of deleting or moving it to another folder