If you bought a share of common stock, you would probably expect to receive dividends plus an eventual capital gain. Would the distribution between the dividend yield and the capital gains yield be influenced by the firm’s decision to pay more dividends rather than to retain and reinvest more of its earnings? Explain

The revenues of a company increased by 39% in year one and decreased 22% in year two. what is the overall change over the two-year period?

9. tax types: taxes are classified based on whether they are applied directly to income, called direct taxes, or to some other measurable performance characteristic of the firm, called indirect taxes. identify each of the following as a “direct tax,” an “indirect tax,” or something else: a. corporate income tax paid by a japanese subsidiary on its operating income b. royalties paid to saudi arabia for oil extracted and shipped to world markets c. interest received by a u.s. parent on bank deposits held in london d. interest received by a u.s. parent on a loan to a subsidiary in mexico e. principal repayment received by u.s. parent from belgium on a loan to a wholly owned subsidiary in belgium f. excise tax paid on cigarettes manufactured and sold within the united states g. property taxes paid on the corporate headquarters building in seattle h. a direct contribution to the international committee of the red cross for refugee relief i. deferred income tax, shown as a deduction on the u.s. parent’s consolidated income tax j. withholding taxes withheld by germany on dividends paid to a united kingdom parent corporation

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?