When Coca-Cola decided to replace its original Coke with the new Coke, even die-hard fans hated the move. This high involvement with such a specific product is due to , which results in repeat purchasing behavior that reflects a conscious decision to continue buying the same brand, despite thc choice of new brands or products.

Job applications give employers uniform information for all employees,making it easier to

8. problems and applications q8there are four consumers willing to pay the following amounts for haircuts, and there are four haircutting businesses with the following costs: consumers' willingness to payyvette: $35cho: $15sean: $45bob: $25firms' costsfirm a: $40firm b: $20firm c: $10firm d: $30each firm has the capacity to produce only one haircut.for should be given.which businesses should cut hair? check all that apply.firm afirm bfirm cfirm dwhich consumers should have their hair cut? check all that apply.bobchoseanyvettethe maximum possible total surplus is

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?