Lobo Lighting Corporation currently employs 100 unskilled laborers, 80 factory technicians, 30 skilled machinists, and 40 skilled electricians. Lobo feels that the marginal product of the last unskilled laborer is 400 lights per week, the marginal product of the last factory technician is 450 lights per week, the marginal product of the last skilled machinist is 550 lights per week, and the marginal product of the last skilled electrician is 600 lights per week. Unskilled laborers earn S400 per week, factory technicians earn $500 per week, machinists earn S700 per week, and electricians earn $750 per week.

Is Lobo using the lowest cost combination of workers to produce its targeted output? If not, what recommendations can you make to assist the company?

Why is the cournot equilibrium an​ equilibrium? a. there are​ short-run barriers to exit in a cournot​ duopoly, so both firms cannot alter their output levels. b. given the other​ firm's level of​ production, both firms are maximizing profits and cannot improve their situation by unilaterally altering their level of output. c. both firms operate at zero profit under a cournot​ equilibrium, so they would face negative profits if they change output. d. both firms operate at minimum​ long-run average cost under a cournot​ equilibrium, so changes to output would reduce​ long-run profits. even if they​ can't collude, why​ don't firms set their outputs at the joint​ profit-maximizing levels​ (i.e., the levels they would have chosen had they​ colluded)? a. given that other firm produces at the collusive​ level, a firm could increase their own profits by increasing output above the collusive level. b. the midpoint of the collusion curve​ (i.e., the collusive​ outcome) lies below the reaction​ curves, so both firms have an incentive to increase output under the cournot duopoly. c. both a and b are correct d. both a and b are incorrect