The phrase ""no such thing as a free lunch"" means a. people must face tradeoffs. b. rational people think at the margin. c. people respond to incentives. d. trade can make everyone better off.

Money aggregates identify whether each of the following examples belongs in m1 or m2. if an example belongs in both, be sure to check both boxes. example m1 m2 gilberto has a roll of quarters that he just withdrew from the bank to do laundry. lorenzo has $25,000 in a money market account. neha has $8,000 in a two-year certificate of deposit (cd).

Amonopolist’s inverse demand function is p = 150 – 3q. the company produces output at two facilities; the marginal cost of producing at facility 1 is mc1(q1) = 6q1, and the marginal cost of producing at facility 2 is mc2(q2) = 2q2.a. provide the equation for the monopolist’s marginal revenue function. (hint: recall that q1 + q2 = q.)mr(q) = 150 - 6 q1 - 3 q2b. determine the profit-maximizing level of output for each facility.output for facility 1: output for facility 2: c. determine the profit-maximizing price.$

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?