Corporate managers work for the owners of the corporation. consequently, they should make decisions that are in the interests of the owners, rather than in their own interests. what strategies are available to shareholders to ensure that managers are motivated to act this way?

Match each item to check for while reconciling a bank account with the document to which it relates. (there's not just one answer) 1. balancing account statement 2. balancing check register a. nsf fees b. deposits in transit c. interest earned d. bank errors

Analyzing operational changes operating results for department b of delta company during 2016 are as follows: sales $540,000 cost of goods sold 378,000 gross profit 162,000 direct expenses 120,000 common expenses 66,000 total expenses 186,000 net loss $(24,000) suppose that department b could increase physical volume of product sold by 10% if it spent an additional $18,000 on advertising while leaving selling prices unchanged. what effect would this have on the department's net income or net loss? (ignore income tax in your calculations.) use a negative sign to indicate a net loss answer; otherwise do not use negative signs with your answers. sales $answer cost of goods sold answer gross profit answer direct expenses answer common expenses answer total expenses answer net income (loss) $answer

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?