The following data is given for the stringer company: budgeted production 26,000 units actual production 27,500 units materials: standard price per ounce $6.50 standard ounces per completed unit 8 actual ounces purchased and used in production 228,000 actual price paid for materials $1,504,800 labor: standard hourly labor rate $22 per hour standard hours allowed per completed unit 6.6 actual labor hours worked 183,000 actual total labor costs $4,020,000 overhead: actual and budgeted fixed overhead $1,029,600 standard variable overhead rate $24.50 per standard labor hour actual variable overhead costs $4,520,000 overhead is applied on standard labor hours. the direct materials price variance is

select one:

a. $22,800 unfavorable
b. $22,800 favorable
c. $52,000 unfavorable
d. $52,000 favorable

Anderson, a computer engineer, and spouse, who is unemployed, provide more than half of the support for their child, age 23, who is a full-time student and who earns $7,000. they also provide more than half of the support for their older child, age 33, who earns $2,000 during the year. how many dependents may the andersons claim on their joint tax return?

Sally has a high-paying management position with a fortune 500 company, but she is tired of working for corporate america. so sally has decided to start a business, and she knows she will be successful as an entrepreneur because entrepreneurs typically

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?