7. debt irrelevance. digital fruit is financed solely by common stock and has outstanding 25 million shares with a market price of $10 a share. it now announces that it intends to issue $160 million of debt and to use the proceeds to buy back common stock. there are no taxes. (lo16-1) a. what is the expected market price of the common stock after the announcement? b. how many shares can the company buy back with the $160 million of new debt that it will issue? c. what is the market value of the firm (equity plus debt) after the change in capital structure? d. what is the debt ratio after the change in capital structure?

The following information is available for juno company for the month ending june 30, 2019. * balance as per the bank statement is $ 11 comma 000. * balance as per books is $ 10 comma 400. * check #506 for $ 1 comma 200 and check #510 for $ 900 were not shown on the june 30, bank statement. * a deposit in transit of $ 3 comma 346 had not been received by the bank when the bank statement was generated. * a bank debit memo indicated an nsf check for $ 70 written by jane smith to juno company on june 13. * a bank credit memo indicated a note collected by the bank of $ 1 comma 900 and interest revenue of $ 51 on june 20. * the bank statement indicated service charges of $ 35. what is the adjusted book balance?

Personal financial planning is the process of creating and achieving financial goals? true or false

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?