Scenario c: panhandle prime energy partners is an organization that has undergone a dramatic transformation over the last few years. earlier, employees were managed using a wide array of rules, regulations, and procedures. offending employees were punished for their violations. today, employees are encouraged to make decisions and come up with innovative solutions to problems they encounter. most employees are much more satisfied under the new arrangement. the group is much more cohesive and is committed not only to the overall success of the organization but also to its standards and reputation. which of the following types of control systems do the middle level managers want to focus;
(a) cocurrent
(b) bureaucratic
(c) clan
(d) market
(e) feedforward

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?