Business, 10.10.2019 13:30 nicoleaaliyah

1): because scarcity exists, people must make choices. explain why?

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Business, 22.06.2019 04:10

Universal containers(us) has an integration with its accounting system that creates tens of thousands of orders inside salesforce in a nightly batch. us wants to add automation that can attempt to match leads and contacts to these orders using the email address field on the insert. us is concerned about the performance of the automation with a large data volume. which tool should uc use to automate this process?

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Business, 22.06.2019 22:00

In which of the following games is it clearly the case that the cooperative outcome of the game is good for the two players and bad for society? a. two oil companies own adjacent oil fields over a common pool of oil, and each company decides whether to drill one well or two wells.b. two airlines dominate air travel between city a and city b, and each airline decides whether to charge a "high" airfare or a "low" airfare on flights between those two cities.c. two superpowers decide whether to build new weapons or to disarm.d. in all of the above cases, the cooperative outcome of the game is good for the two players and bad for society

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Business, 22.06.2019 22:10

What is private equity investing? who participates in it and why? how is palamon positioned in the industry? how does private equity investing compare with public market investing? what are the similarities and differences between the two? why is palamon interested in teamsystem? does it fit with palamon’s investment strategy? how much is 51% of teamsystem’s common equity worth? use both a discounted cash flow and a multiple-based valuation to justify your recommendation. what complexities do cross-border deals introduce? what are the specific risks of this deal? what should louis elson recommend to his partners? is it a go or not? if it is a go, what nonprice terms are important? if it’s not a go, what counterproposal would you make?

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Business, 23.06.2019 00:00

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?