Start at the original (correct) equilibrium price and quantity in part a. suppose that the government wishes to decrease the market equilibrium monthly rent by increasing the supply of housing. assuming that demand remains unchanged, by how many units of housing would the government have to increase the supply of housing in order to get the market equilibrium rental price to fall to $1,500 per month?

Omnidata uses the annualized income method to determine its quarterly federal income tax payments. it had $100,000, $50,000, and $90,000 of taxable income for the first, second, and third quarters, respectively ($240,000 in total through the first three quarters). what is omnidata's annual estimated taxable income for purposes of calculating the third quarter estimated payment?

Suppose that a paving company produces paved parking spaces (q) using a fixed quantity of land (t) and variable quantities of cement (c) and labor (l). the firm is currently paving 1,000 parking spaces. the firm's cost of cement is $3 comma 600.003,600.00 per acre covered (c) and its cost of labor is $35.0035.00/hour (w). for the quantities of c and l that the firm has chosen, mp subscript upper c baseline equals 60mpc=60 and mp subscript upper l baseline equals 7mpl=7. is this firm minimizing its cost of producing parking spaces?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?