An incumbent firm (player 2) dominates an industry. a potential entrant (player 1) can choose to enter the market or to stay out. player 2, the incumbent, after observing the action of the entrant, chooses to let it enter the market (accomodate, represented by a) or start a price war (fight represented by f). fighting a price war would prevent player 1 from entering the market, but hurt also the incumbent the payoffs for the players in each of the possible outcomes are given by the pair (x, y) at the leaves of the following game tree: x denotes the payoff of player 1 (the entrant) and y denotes the payoff of player 2 (the incumbent) entrant out in incumbent (1,2) а f (2,1) (0,0) assume that both the entrant and the incumbent have perfect information (they know the payoffs associated with each outcome) and care only about maximizing their payoff. what will be the outcome of the game? select one:
a. the incumbent and the entrant will merge and share their monopoly rents.
b. it is not possible to say.
c. the entrant will go in; the incumbent will fight (f)
d. both the entrant and the incumbent will exit the industry and enjoy their fallback position
e. the entrant will go in; the incumbent will accomodate (a)
f. the entrant will choose to stay out.