Greta, an elderly investor, has a degree of risk aversion of a = 3 when applied to return on wealth over a one-year horizon. she is pondering two portfolios, the s& p 500 and a hedge fund, as well as a number of one-year strategies. (all rates are annual and continuously compounded.) the s& p 500 risk premium is estimated at 5% per year, with a sd of 20%. the hedge fund risk premium is estimated at 10% with a sd of 35%. the returns on both of these portfolios in any particular year are uncorrelated with its own returns in other years. they are also uncorrelated with the returns of the other portfolio in other years. the hedge fund claims the correlation coefficient between the annual returns on the s& p 500 and the hedge fund in the same year is zero, but greta is not fully convinced by this claim. compute the estimated annual risk premiums, sds, and sharpe ratios for the two portfolios

Granby foods' (gf) balance sheet shows a total of $25 million long-term debt with a coupon rate of 8.50%. the yield to maturity on this debt is 8.00%, and the debt has a total current market value of $27 million. the company has 10 million shares of stock, and the stock has a book value per share of $5.00. the current stock price is $20.00 per share, and stockholders' required rate of return, r s, is 12.25%. the company recently decided that its target capital structure should have 35% debt, with the balance being common equity. the tax rate is 40%. calculate waccs based on book, market, and target capital structures. what is the sum of these three waccs?

Over the past decade, brands that were once available only to the wealthy have created more affordable product extensions, giving a far broader range of consumers a taste of the good life. jaguar, for instance, launched its x-type sedan, which starts at $30,000 and is meant for the "almost rich" consumer who aspires to live in luxury. by marketing to people who desire a luxurious lifestyle, jaguar is using:

Suppose that two firms produce differentiated products and compete in prices. as in class, the two firms are located at two ends of a line one mile apart. consumers are evenly distributed along the line. the firms have identical marginal cost, $60. firm b produces a product with value $110 to consumers.firm a (located at 0 on the unit line) produces a higher quality product with value $120 to consumers. the cost of travel are directly related to the distance a consumer travels to purchase a good. if a consumerhas to travel a mile to purchase a good, the incur a cost of $20. if they have to travel x fraction of a mile, they incur a cost of $20x. (a) write down the expressions for how much a consumer at location d would value the products sold by firms a and b, if they set prices p_{a} and p_{b} ? (b) based on your expressions in (a), how much will be demanded from each firm if prices p_{a} and p_{b} are set? (c) what are the nash equilibrium prices?