Under the new type of psychological contract, organizations expect employees to contribute time, effort, skills, abilities, and loyalty in return for job security and opportunities for promotion within the organization.
true / false.

2. the language of price controls consider the market for rental cars. suppose that, in a competitive market without government regulations, the equilibrium price of rental cars is $58 per day, and employees at car rental companies earn $19.50 per hour. complete the following table by indicating whether each of the statements is an example of a price ceiling or a price floor and whether it results in a shortage or a surplus or has no effect on the price and quantity that prevail in the market. statement price control effect there are many teenagers who would like to work at car rental companies, but the minimum-wage law sets the hourly wage at $23.00. the government has instituted a legal minimum price of $87 per day for rental cars. the government prohibits car rental companies from renting out rental cars for more than $87 per day.

As the inventor of hypertension medication, onesure pharmaceuticals (osp) inc. was able to reap the benefits of economies of scale due to a large consumer demand for the drug. even when competitors later developed similar drugs after the expiry of osp's patents, regular users did not want to switch because they were concerned about possible side effects. which of the following benefits does this scenario best illustrate? a. first-mover advantages b. social benefits c. network externalities d. fringe benefits

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?